

Page Denied

25X1

Central Intelligence Agency

Executive Registry
84 - 873/1

Washington, D.C. 20505

21 February 1984

The Honorable Paul H. Robinson, Jr.
American Ambassador
Embassy of the United States
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In the Director's absence, I wish to thank you for your 8 February 1984 letter which enclosed your statement on the military balance. It will be brought to Mr. Casey's attention upon his return.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Executive Secretary

25X1

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - DCI

1 - ES Chrono

1 - ER

(21 Feb 84)

[Redacted Box]

25X1



B-309

Executive Registry

84 - 873

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OTTAWA, CANADA

February 8, 1984

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

Enclosed is a statement on the military balance
taken from recent speeches which I hope will
be of interest to you.

Sincerely,



Paul H. Robinson, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure.



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OTTAWA, CANADA

STATEMENT ON THE MILITARY BALANCE
FROM SPEECHES BY PAUL H. ROBINSON, JR.
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO CANADA

In my travels across Canada, I have noted a broad range of views on the issue of national defense. A surprising number of people seem to underestimate the circumstances and the gravity of the world situation today. Others, who agree that this is a dangerous period in history, seem to think that these dangers are equally attributable to United States and to Soviet behavior. Therefore, I have felt that it would be useful, as U.S. Ambassador to Canada, to address some of these issues openly because they vitally affect the destinies of the people of both nations. As President Reagan has said, all of our defense efforts must be directed towards the preservation of peace and towards the prevention of a nuclear war that is not winnable, would not be confined to Europe alone and must never be allowed to occur. At a time when the Soviet Union has chosen to leave the negotiating table rather than seriously discuss proposals to lower intermediate and strategic nuclear force levels, it is well to recall events which have led us to the present anxious situation.

Over 40 years ago the Soviet Union embarked upon an unparalleled policy of territorial aggrandizement with the invasion of the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Today, its policy remains the same. It will, of course, be remembered that four years ago the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Today the Soviets have 110,000 troops in that country. In addition, its direct intervention in Poland by the imposition of martial law is fresh in our memories. Recently, we have also seen the use of Soviet surrogates in Angola, in Ethiopia and in South Yemen.

-2-

Over 20 years ago, following the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union embarked upon an unprecedented military build-up, the likes of which has not been seen since the Nazi rearmament prior to the Second World War. Over the last ten years the Soviets have devoted twice as much of their Gross National Product to military expenditures as the United States. What has this produced in terms of the balance of conventional arms in the world today? The Soviets have 361 fleet submarines; that is three times what the U.S. has. The Soviets have 20,000 pieces of field artillery and mortars; that is four times what the U.S. has. The Soviets have 50,000 tanks and 62,000 armoured vehicles; that is five times what the U.S. has. In addition, the Soviets have us outnumbered two to one in tactical air. So it is two to one in tactical air; three to one in fleet submarines; four to one in field artillery and mortars and five to one in tanks and armoured vehicles. One final statistic; they have produced six times as many ICBMs as the United States in the last ten years. This is all declared for the world to see in a publication of the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies entitled THE MILITARY BALANCE. These are somber facts, but facts they are.

In these circumstances, the efforts of our allies assume even greater importance. We are pleased to see that Canada has turned the corner in appropriations for defense to the extent that last year's budget increased expenditures by 11.3 percent before inflation and that the Government of Canada has again reaffirmed its commitment for a three percent annual increase in defense expenditures net of inflation. However, Canada remains at the bottom of the NATO heap with Luxembourg and Iceland in terms of defense expenditures as a percentage of Gross National Product. We would hope that this shortfall will be remedied.

What is our policy? The United States and NATO have pursued a common defensive goal which is to maintain a credible deterrent force at the lowest possible level. What this means is that the NATO policy is a two-track policy of negotiation in good faith on the one hand and deployment to counterbalance Soviet armament and missiles on the other if these negotiations do not bear fruit. This NATO decision was made in December of 1979; deployment began in December 1983.

-3-

The Soviets have now terminated the INF negotiations in Geneva. They have also left the START negotiations in Geneva and have not agreed to a date for a renewal of these strategic talks. They have said that their reason for doing so is our planned deployment of 572 Pershing II and cruise intermediate missiles over a period of five years saying that these deployments are destabilizing. What then is the balance of intermediate range missiles in Europe today? The Soviets have 611 missiles in place in Europe today. Of these, 243 are MIRVed three times producing just under 1100 warheads in the Soviet arsenal. Pursuant to the NATO agreement we deployed 10 Pershing IIs and 15 cruise missiles in Europe in December 1983. These new missiles, when added to the 180 Pershing I's already in place (which will be removed as additional Pershing II's and Cruise Missiles are deployed) total 205 warheads. Therefore, the warhead ratio is 1100 to 205 or better than five to one. At the end of the deployment period the Soviet ratio would be two to one; 1100 to 572 if no additional Soviet missiles are deployed. Under these circumstances, anyone who says that deployment of the NATO intermediate range missiles in Europe is destabilizing, is either ignorant or lying.

Insofar as the strategic arms reduction talks are concerned, the President has said that our initial object is to reduce strategic warheads by one-third. This would amount to 5,000 warheads. He would also reduce launchers (ground, sea and air launched) by one-half by the end of the first phase of these negotiations. Moreover, it should be remembered that the President over a year ago suggested a zero-zero option which would remove all intermediate range missiles from the European continent. The Soviets objected to this as they would have had to remove 1100 to our 180 warheads. Insofar as battlefield weapons are concerned, it should be noted that four months ago we and our allies agreed to withdraw 1400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This was unilaterally decided and comes after removal of a thousand battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate range missiles have to be deployed in Europe, however, America's total nuclear weapons have declined by one-third in the past 20 years. In terms of total megatonnage (destructive power) our nuclear stockpile has been cut by 40 percent since 1970.

To further reduce the nuclear stockpile, the President has suggested what is termed a "build-down"; this is to say that two nuclear warheads must be removed for each new warhead in a more advanced system deployed. The long-range objective of this would be to remove nuclear weapons entirely.

-4-

The question remains as to whether or not the Soviets will return to the negotiating table. It certainly is in their interest as well as our own. The Soviet intransigency is a misguided attempt to influence elections in the United States and to paint the President as a "warmonger". This in spite of the fact that the Soviets are the ones who have unilaterally walked out on the INF talks while still preserving their overwhelming military strength in Europe. Furthermore, their strategy of attempting to influence elections will backfire with the American electorate just as it did in the German election of 1983.

The President has said that despite our differences the United States and the Soviet Union continue to share common interests, and that "foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms." In January of this year the President, in a major address on Soviet-American relations, said that there is no rational alternative but to steer a course which he described as credible deterrence and peaceful competition. If we adopt this approach we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation. He further said that we must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue "that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms and build a constructive working relationship."

In any event, we look forward to the eventual removal of all nuclear weapons from the world scene. We will continue to deal with the Soviets in Vienna and Stockholm or anywhere in the world to bring about meaningful arms reduction and thereby forge a new basis for peace and understanding in the world.

Ottawa, February 1984